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Abstract
In the typical analysis of a data set, a single method is selected for statistical re-
porting even when equally applicable methods yield very different results. Examples
of equally applicable methods can correspond to those of different ancillary statistics
in frequentist inference and of different prior distributions in Bayesian inference. More
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broadly, choices are made between parametric and nonparametric methods and be-
tween frequentist and Bayesian methods. Rather than choosing a single method, it can
be safer, in a game-theoretic sense, to combine those that are equally appropriate in
light of the available information. Since methods of combining subjectively assessed
probability distributions are not objective enough for that purpose, this paper intro-
duces a method of distribution combination that does not require any assignment of
distribution weights. It does so by formalizing a hedging strategy in terms of a game
between three players: nature, a statistician combining distributions, and a statistician
refusing to combine distributions. The optimal move of the first statistician reduces to
the solution of a simpler problem of selecting an estimating distribution that minimizes
the Kullback-Leibler loss maximized over the plausible distributions to be combined.
The resulting combined distribution is a linear combination of the most extreme of the
distributions to be combined that are scientifically plausible. The optimal weights are
close enough to each other that no extreme distribution dominates the others. The new
methodology is illustrated by combining conflicting empirical Bayes methodologies in
the context of gene expression data analysis.
Keywords: ancillarity; conditional inference; combining probabilities; combining probabil-
ity distributions; combining tests in parallel; confidence distribution; confidence posterior;
cross entropy; game theory; imprecise probability; inferential gain; Kullback-Leibler infor-
mation; Kullback-Leibler divergence; large-scale simultaneous inference; linear opinion pool;
minimax redundancy; multiple hypothesis testing; multiple comparison procedure; observed
confidence level; redundancy-capacity theorem
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1 Introduction
The analysis of biological data often requires choices between methods that seem equally
applicable and yet that can yield very different results. This occurs not only with the noto-
rious problems in frequentist statistics of conditioning on one of multiple ancillary statistics
and in Bayesian statistics of selecting one of many appropriate priors, but also in choices
between frequentist and Bayesian methods, in whether to use a potentially powerful para-
metric test to analyze a small sample of unknown distribution, in whether and how to adjust
for multiple testing, and in whether to use a frequentist model averaging procedure. Today,
statisticians simultaneously testing thousands of hypotheses must often decide whether to
apply a multiple comparisons procedure using the assumption that the p-value is uniform
under the null hypothesis (theoretical null distribution) or a null distribution estimated from
the data (empirical null distribution). While the empirical null reduces estimation bias in
many situations (Efron, 2007), it also increases variance (Efron, 2010) and substantially
increases bias when the data distributions have heavy tails (Bickel, 2011d). Without any
strong indication of which method can be expected to perform better for a particular data
set, combining their estimated false discovery rates or adjusted p-values may be the safest
approach.
Emphasizing the reference class problem, Barndorff-Nielsen (1995) pointed out the need
for ways to assess the evidence in the diversity of statistical inferences that can be drawn
from the same data. Previous applications of p-value combination have included combining
inferences from different ancillary statistics (Good, 1984), combining inferences from more
robust procedures with those from procedures with stronger assumptions, and combining
inferences from different alternative distributions (Good, 1958). However, those combination
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procedures are only justified by a heuristic Bayesian argument and have not been widely
adopted. To offer a viable alternative, the problem of combining conflicting methods is
framed herein in terms of probability combination.
Most existing methods of automatically combining probability distributions have been
designed for the integration of expert opinions. For example, Toda (1956), Abbas (2009), and
Kracík (2011) proposed combining distributions to minimize a weighted sum of Kullback-
Leibler divergences from the distributions being combined, with the weights determined
subjectively, e.g., by the elicitation of the opinions of the experts who provided the distribu-
tions or by the extent to which each expert is considered credible. Under broad conditions,
that approach leads to the linear combination of the distributions that is defined by those
weights (Toda, 1956; Kracík, 2011).
“Linear opinion pools” also result from this marginalization property : any linearly com-
bined marginal distribution is the same whether marginalization or combination is carried
out first (McConway, 1981). The marginalization property forbids certain counterintuitive
combinations of distributions, including any combination of distributions that differs in a
probability assignment from the unanimous assignment of all distributions combined (Cooke,
1991, p. 173). Combinations violating the marginalization property can be expected to per-
form poorly as estimators regardless of their appeal as distributions of belief. On the other
hand, invariance to reversing the order of Bayesian updating and distribution combination
instead requires a “logarithmic opinion pool,” which uses a geometric mean in place the
arithmetic mean of the linear opinion pool; see, e.g., Berger (1985, §4.11.1) or Clemen and
Winkler (1999). While that property is preferable to the marginalization property from the
point of view of a Bayesian agent making decisions on the basis of independent reports of
other Bayesian agents, it is less suitable for combining distributions that are highly depen-
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dent or that are distribution estimates rather than actual distributions of belief. Genest and
Zidek (1986) and Cooke (1991, Ch. 11) review these and related issues.
Like those methods, the strategy introduced in this paper is intended for combining
distributions based on the same data or information as opposed to combining distributions
based on independent data sets. However, to relax the requirement that the distributions
be provided by experts, the weights are optimized rather than specified. While the new
strategy leads to a linear combination of distributions, the combination hedges by including
only the most extreme distributions rather than all of the distributions. In addition, the game
leading to the hedging takes into account any known constraints on the true distribution.
See Remark 1 on the pivotal role game theory played in the foundations of statistics.
The game that generates the hedging strategy is played between three players: the mech-
anism that generates the true distribution (“Nature”), a statistician who never combines
distributions (“Chooser”), and a statistician open to combining distributions (“Combiner”).
Nature must select a distribution that complies with constraints known to the statisticians,
who want to choose distributions as close as possible to the distribution chosen by Nature.
Other things being equal, each statistician would also like to select a distribution that is as
much better than that of the other statistician as possible. Thus, each statistician seeks pri-
marily to come close to the truth and secondarily to improve upon the distribution selected
by the other statistician. Combiner has the advantage over Chooser that the former may
select any distribution, whereas the latter must select one from a given set of the distribu-
tions that estimate the true distribution or that encode expert opinion. On the other hand,
Combiner is disadvantaged in that Nature seeks to maximize the gain of Chooser without
concern for the gain of Combiner. Since Nature favors Chooser without opposing Combiner,
the optimal strategy of Combiner is one of hedging but is less cautious than the minimax
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strategies that are often optimal for typical two-player zero-sum games against Nature. The
distribution chosen according to the strategy of Combiner will be considered the combina-
tion of the distributions available to Chooser. The combination distribution is a function
not only of the combining distributions but also of the constraints on the true distribution.
Sec. 2 encodes the game and strategy described above in terms of Kullback-Leibler
loss and presents its optimal solution as a general method of combining distributions. The
important special case of combining probabilities is then worked out. A framework for
using the proposed combination method to resolve method conflicts in point and interval
estimation, hypothesis testing, and other aspects of statistical data analysis will be presented
in Sec. 3. The framework is illustrated by applying it to the combination of three false
discovery rate methods for the analysis of microarray data in Sec. 4. Finally, Appendices A
and B collect miscellaneous remarks and proofs, respectively.
2 Framework for combining distributions
2.1 Information-theoretic background
Let P denote the set of probability distributions on a Borel space (Ξ,B (Ξ)), where B (Ξ) is
the set of all Borel subsets of Ξ. The information divergence of P ∈ P with respect to Q ∈ P
is defined as
D (P ||Q) =
∫
dP (ξ) log
dP (ξ)
dQ (ξ)
, (1)
where dP and dQ are probability density functions of P andQ in the sense of Radon-Nikodym
differentiation with respect to the same dominating measure (Haussler, 1997). The integrand
follows the 0 log (0) = 0 and 0 log (0/0) = 0 conventions. D (P ||Q) is also known as “informa-
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tion for discrimination,” “Kullback-Leibler information,” “Kullback-Leibler divergence,” and
“cross entropy.” Calling D (P ||Q) “information divergence” emphasizes its interpretation as
the amount of information that would be gained by replacing any distribution Q with the
true distribution P . That interpretation accords with calling
D (P ′||P ′′  Q) = D (P ′||P ′′)−D (P ′||Q) (2)
the information gain (Pfaffelhuber, 1977), the amount of information gained by using Q
rather than P ′′ ∈ P when the true distribution is P ′ ∈ P (cf. Topsøe, 2007).
For any real parameter set Φ and family P? = {Pφ : φ ∈ Φ} of probability distributions
such that P? ⊆ P , the distribution
P˜? = arg inf
Q∈P
sup
P ?∈P?
D (P ?||Q) (3)
is called the centroid of P? (Csiszár and Körner, 2011, p. 131). Let W denote the set of all
measures on the Borel space (Φ,B (Φ)). Reserving the term prior for Sec. 3, members of W
will be called weighting distributions. Then PW = EWP? =
∫
PφdW (φ) defines the mixture
distribution of P? with respect to some W ∈ W , and
WP? = arg sup
W∈W
∫
D (Pφ||EWP?) dW (φ) (4)
defines the weighting distribution induced by P?.
Example 1. In the case of a family of ν distributions, the parameter set can be written as
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Φ = {φ1, . . . , φν} and the weighting distribution as
〈WP? (φ1) , . . . ,WP? (φν)〉 = arg sup
w1∈[0,1],...,wν∈[0,1]
∑
i=1,...,ν
wiD
(
Pφ||
∑
j=1,...,ν
wjPφj
)
,
where the supremum is that of the set of weight ν-tuples constrained by
∑ν
i=1wi = 1.
Shulman and Feder (2004) proved that, for all i = 1, . . . , ν,
WP? (φi) ≤ 1− e−1 .= 63%. (5)
N
The next known result will prove useful in determining the optimal move in the game of
combining distributions that was mentioned in Sec. 1.
Lemma 1. The centroid of any nonempty P? ⊆ P is P˜? = PWP? , whereWP? is the weighting
distribution induced by P?.
Proof. Two different proofs appear in Haussler (1997) and in Grünwald and Philip Dawid
(2004). For some history of this result, see Remark 2.
2.2 Distribution-combination game
The game sketched in Sec. 1 will now be specified in the above notation. Two sets constrain
moves in the game: the plausible set P˙ is the subset of P consisting of given plausible
distributions, and P¨ ⊆ P consists of given combining distributions. The move of Nature is a
distribution P˙ ∈ P˙ ; the move of Chooser is a distribution P¨ ∈ P¨ ; the move of Combiner is
a distribution P+ ∈ P . Chooser and Combiner are called statisticians. If P1 is the move of
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one statistician and P2 is that of the other, then the amount of utility paid to the latter is
the pair
U
(
P˙ , P1, P2
)
=
〈
−D
(
P˙ ||P2
)
, D
(
P˙ ||P1  P2
)〉
, (6)
understood in terms of preferring v = 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [0,∞)× [0,∞) over u = 〈u1, u2〉 ∈ [0,∞)×
[0,∞) if and only if u  v. Here, u  v means that either u1 < v1 or both u1 = v1 and
u2 ≤ v2. Such preferences are said to have lexicographic ordering (Remark 3).
Thus, the utility paid to Combiner will be U
(
P˙ , P¨ , P+
)
and that paid to Chooser will
be U
(
P˙ , P+, P¨
)
. The utility paid to Nature will also be U
(
P˙ , P+, P¨
)
, with the implication
that it is to the advantage of Nature and Chooser to act as a coalition with move
〈
P˙ , P¨
〉
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953, Ch. 5). Although that reduces the three-player game
to a two-player game of the coalition versus Combiner, it is not necessarily of zero sum.
The combination of the distributions in P¨ with truth constrained by P˙ is defined as
Combiner’s optimal move in the game. Since the utility paid to the Nature-Chooser coalition
is U
(
P˙ , P+, P¨
)
, Combiner’s best move may be written as
P+ = arg

sup
Q∈P:〈P˙Q,P¨Q〉∈PQ
U
(
P˙Q, P¨Q, Q
)
(7)
for all Q ∈ P , where sup is the least upper bound according to , and
PQ = arg sup
〈P ′,P ′′〉∈P˙×P¨
U (P ′, Q, P ′′) . (8)
While P+ is not necessarily a plausible distribution, it is typically at the center of the
plausible set:
Theorem 1. Let P+ denote the combination of the distributions in P¨ with truth constrained
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by P˙. If P˙ ∩ P¨ 6= ∅, then
P+ = ˜˙P ∩ P¨ = PWP˙∩P¨ , (9)
where ˜˙P ∩ P¨ is the centroid of P˙ ∩ P¨, and WP˙∩P¨ is the weighting distribution induced by
P˙ ∩ P¨, as defined by eq. (4).
LetA denote an action space. A decision made by taking the action a ∈ A that minimizes
the expectation value of a loss function L : Ξ×A → R with respect to P+ is optimal in the
game when the utility function of eq. (6) is replaced with
〈
−D
(
P˙ ||P2
)
, D
(
P˙ ||P1  P2
)
,−
∫
L (ξ, a) dP2 (ξ)
〉
.
The latter utility function is understood in terms of the lexicographic ordering relation 4,
which is defined such that 〈u1, u2, u3〉 4 〈v1, v2, v3〉 if and only if one of the following is true:
(i) u1 < v1; (ii) u1 = v1 and u2 < v2; (iii) u1 = v1, u2 = v2, and u3 ≤ v3. On related orderings
in the literature, see Remark 3.
2.3 Combining discrete distributions
Now let P denote the set of probability distributions on (Ξ, 2Ξ) , where Ξ is a finite set
written as Ξ = {0, 1, ..., |Ξ| − 1} without loss of generality. Then the information divergence
of P with respect to Q (1) reduces to
D (P ||Q) =
∑
i∈Ξ
P ({i}) log P ({i})
Q ({i}) .
For any P ∈ P and ξ ∼ P , the |Ξ|-tuple T (P ) = 〈P (ξ = 0) , P (ξ = 1) , . . . , P (ξ = |Ξ| − 1)〉
will be called the tuple representing P .
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Let P? denote a nonempty subset of P , and let T (P?) denote the set of tuples repre-
senting the members of P?, i.e., T (P?) = {T (P ?) : P ? ∈ P?}. Likewise, noting that the
map T is one-to-one, the extreme subset of P? is defined as extP? = T −1 (ext co T (P?)) ,
where ext co T (P?) is the set of extreme points of co T (P?), the convex hull of T (P?). The
extreme subset simplifies the problem of locating a centroid:
Lemma 2. Let P? denote a nonempty, finite subset of P. If there are a Q ∈ P and a C > 0
such that D (P ?||Q) = C for all P ? ∈ extP?, then Q is the centroid of P?.
More simplification is possible if at least one of the combining distributions is plausible:
Theorem 2. Let P+ denote the combination of the distributions in P¨ with truth constrained
by P˙. If P˙ ∩ P¨ is nonempty and finite, then P+ = PWext(P˙∩P¨) , where Wext(P˙∩P¨) is the
weighting distribution induced (4) by ext
(
P˙ ∩ P¨
)
, the extreme subset of P˙ ∩ P¨.
The combination of a set of probabilities of the same hypothesis (§3) or event is simply a
linear combination or mixture of the highest and lowest of the plausible probabilities in the
set, with the mixing proportion determined optimally:
Corollary 1. Let P+ denote the combination of the distributions in P¨ with truth constrained
by P˙. Suppose c distributions on ({0, 1} , 2{0,1}) are to be combined (P¨ = {P¨1, ..., P¨c}), and
let P˙0 =
{
P˙ ({0}) : P˙ ∈ P˙
}
and P¨ , P¨ ∈ P such that
P¨ ({0}) = min
i=1,...,c:P¨i({0})∈P˙0
P¨i ({0}) ; P¨ ({0}) = max
i=1,...,c:P¨i({0})∈P˙0
P¨i ({0}) .
If P¨i ({0}) ∈ P˙0 for some i ∈ {1, ..., c}, then P+ = w+P¨ + (1− w+) P¨ , where
w+ = arg sup
w∈[0,1]
(
w∆
(
P¨ ||w
)
+ (1− w) ∆
(
P¨ ||w
))
; (10)
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∆ (•||w) = D
(
•||wP¨ + (1− w) P¨
)
.
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 2 and the definition of an extreme subset.
By eq. (5), 37%≤˙w+≤˙63%, implying that P+ ({0}) is close to the arithmetic mean[
P¨ ({0}) + P¨ ({0})
]
/2, as Shulman and Feder (2004) observed in a coding context. Fig. 1
plots w+ versus P¨ ({0}) and P¨ ({0}), and Fig. 2 compares the resulting P+ ({0}) to the
arithmetic mean, the geometric mean, and the harmonic mean of P¨ ({0}) and P¨ ({0}).
The next result is important for multiple hypothesis testing (§3) and, more generally, for
combining probabilities of independent events rather than entire distributions.
Corollary 2. Let ξ = 〈ξ1, . . . , ξN〉, where ξj is a Bernoulli random variable and ξj is inde-
pendent of ξJ for all j, J = 1, . . . N . (The Bernoulli distributions need not be identical: in
general, each has a different probability P¨ (ξi = 0) of failure. Every P¨ ∈ P¨ has a one-to-one
correspondence to a tuple
〈
P¨ (ξ1 = 0) , . . . , P¨ (ξN = 0)
〉
.) Assuming P˙ ∩ P¨ is nonempty and
finite, let P¨i denote the ith of the ν members of ext
(
P˙ ∩ P¨
)
=
{
P¨1, . . . , P¨ν
}
. If the con-
straints are in the form of lower and upper probabilities P 0,1, . . . , P 0,N and P 0,1, . . . , P 0,N
such that
P˙ =
{
P˙ ∈ P : P 0j ≤ P˙ (ξj = 0) ≤ P 0j, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
}
, (11)
then the set of combining distributions that satisfy the constraints is
P˙ ∩ P¨ =
{
P¨ ∈ P¨ : P 0j ≤ P¨ (ξj = 0) ≤ P 0j, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
}
. (12)
Further, P+ = Pwext(P˙∩P¨) is the combination of the distributions in P¨ with truth constrained
by P˙, where
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wext(P˙∩P¨) = arg sup〈w1,...,wν〉∈W
ν∑
i=1
wi
N∑
j=1
1∑
k=0
P¨i (ξj = k) log
P¨i (ξj = k)
P 〈w1,...,wν〉 (ξj = k)
(13)
with the supremum over W = {〈w′1, . . . , w′ν〉 ∈ (0, 1]ν :
∑ν
i=1w
′
i = 1}.
Proof. Eq. (12) is obvious from eq. (11). By the independence condition, the chain rule for
information divergence (see, e.g., Cover and Thomas, 2006, Theorem 2.5.3) reduces finding
the weighting distribution for according to Theorem 2 to finding
wext(P˙∩P¨) = arg sup〈w1,...,wν〉∈W
ν∑
i=1
wi
N∑
j=1
D
(
P¨i (ξj = •) ||P 〈w1,...,wν〉 (ξj = •)
)
,
which, with eq. (1), yields eq. (13).
3 Distribution combination for statistical inference
Whereas much of the literature focuses on combining priors from experts, Sec. 3.1 instead
focuses on combining posteriors. The posterior-inference setting enables the combination not
only of Bayesian posterior distributions but also of confidence intervals and p-values encoded
as frequentist posterior distributions, as will be explained in Sec. 3.2.
3.1 Combining posterior distributions and probabilities
In the context of posterior statistical inference, ξ represents a random parameter. Further,
all distributions in P˙ , the set of plausible distributions of ξ, and P¨ , the set of combining
distributions of ξ, are posterior with respect to the same data set x. All distributions in P˙
and all Bayesian posteriors in P¨ are conditional on X = x, where, for any such posterior,
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the distribution of X depends on the random value of the parameter drawn from some prior.
P¨ may also contain non-Bayesian posteriors such as a confidence posterior or a distribution
derived from a confidence posterior (§3.2).
Accordingly, the information divergence D (P ||Q) becomes the amount of information
that would be gained by replacing any posterior Q with the true posterior P . That interpre-
tation leads to viewing D (P ′||P ′′  Q) as the amount of information gained for statistical
inference by using some posterior Q ∈ P rather than a given posterior P ′′ ∈ P¨ when the
plausible posterior is P ′ ∈ P˙ . Thus, D (P ′||P ′′  Q) defines the inferential gain of Q relative
to P ′′ given P ′ (Bickel, 2011a,c).
The posterior distributions are combined according to Sec. 2.2, using Theorem 1 when-
ever possible. If P˙ represents the uncertainty around a Bayesian posterior P˙ ∈ P˙ , as in
Gajdos et al. (2004) and Bickel (2011c), then P˙ is included in P¨ as one of the distributions
to combine. The resulting combination P+ is then used to minimize expected loss in order
to optimize actions such as point, interval, and function estimators and predictors.
In model selection and hypothesis testing, ξ has 0 or 1 as its realized value, with ξ = 0 if
a reduced model or null hypothesis is true or ξ = 1 if a full model or alternative hypothesis
is true. Corollary 1 applies to this problem with P˙0 as the set of feasible null hypothesis
posterior probabilities and P¨0 =
{
P¨1 ({0}) , ..., P¨c ({0})
}
as the set of null hypothesis poste-
rior probabilities to be combined, where P¨i ({0}) = P¨i (ξ = 0) is the ith posterior probability
that the null hypothesis is true. Thus, the combination posterior probability that the null
hypothesis is true is
P+ (ξ = 0) = w+P¨ (ξ = 0) +
(
1− w+) P¨ (ξ = 0) . (14)
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Here, P¨ (ξ = 0) = P¨ (0) and P¨ (ξ = 0) = P¨ (0) are respectively the lowest and highest null
hypothesis posterior probabilities that are in P˙0∩P¨0, presently assumed to have at least one
member, and w+ is determined by eq. (10). The same idea applies to multiple hypothesis
testing, as will be seen in Sec. 4.
3.2 Combining frequentist posteriors
3.2.1 Confidence posteriors
As mentioned in Sec. 3.2, the set P¨ of posterior combining distributions can include those
representing confidence intervals and p-values. To emphasize their comparability to Bayesian
posterior distributions, these frequentist distributions are called “confidence posterior distri-
butions” (Bickel, 2011b), also known as “confidence distributions” (see, e.g., Schweder and
Hjort, 2002).
Briefly, a confidence posterior distribution that corresponds to a set of nested confidence
intervals evaluated for the observed data is defined as the probability distribution according
to which the posterior probability that the interest parameter lies within a confidence interval
is equal to the confidence level of the interval. For example, if a 95% confidence interval for a
real parameter is [−2.2, 1.7], then there is a 95% posterior probability that the parameter is
between −2.2 and 1.7 according to the confidence posterior. The same confidence posterior
for the data also assigns posterior probability to parameter intervals of interest according to
the confidence levels of the matching confidence intervals, e.g., Bickel (2011d) considered a
one-sided p-value as the posterior probability that the population mean is in (−∞, 0) rather
than [0,∞). Efron and Tibshirani (1998) and Polansky (2007) considered exact confidence
posterior probabilities of intervals or other regions specified before observing the data as
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ideal cases of “attained confidence levels” and “observed confidence levels,” respectively.
Bickel (2011b,d) proposed taking actions that minimize expected loss with respect to
a confidence posterior distribution. Since that distribution is a Kolmogorov probability
distribution of the parameter of interest, such actions comply with most axiomatic systems
usually considered Bayesian, e.g., the systems of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) and
Savage (1954). A human or artificial intelligent agent that bets and makes other decisions in
accordance with minimizing expected loss with respect to a confidence posterior corresponds
to equating the confidence level of a confidence interval with the agent’s level of belief that
the parameter value lies in the interval (Bickel, 2011b).
The decision-theoretic framework makes confidence posteriors suitable as members of P¨ ,
the set of combining distributions, according to the methodology of Sec. 2. They can be
combined to not only with each other, but also with other parameter distributions such as
Bayesian posteriors based on proper or improper priors. The same applies to a probability
distribution of a function of a parameter drawn from a confidence posterior. Such posteriors
have been used to equate posterior probabilities of simple null hypotheses with two-sided
p-values (van Berkum et al., 1996; Bickel, 2011e,a,c). For terminological economy, these
posteriors will now be called “confidence posteriors.”
To approximate Bayesian model averaging, Good (1958) recommended a weighted har-
monic mean of p-values computed from the same data, provided that they range from 10−3
to 0.2, the limits used in Fig. 2. Since the one-sided or two-sided p-values are posterior
probabilities of the null hypothesis derived from different confidence posteriors, eqs. (10)
and (14) can be applied with P¨ (ξ = 0) and P¨ (ξ = 0) as the lowest and highest p-values that
are plausible as null hypothesis probabilities, i.e., that are in P˙0. The resulting combina-
tion p-value differs from that of Good (1958) in two respects: the mean is arithmetic (14)
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rather than harmonic and, even more important, the weights are optimal for the game (10)
rather than subjective. The use of optimal weights leads to preparing for the worst case by
averaging only the two most extreme p-values rather than all of them.
Example 2. Given a small sample of data drawn from a distribution that might be approx-
imately normal, let p(1) and p(2) denote the two-sided p-values according to the t-test and
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, respectively; p(1) < p(2). Under conditions often applicable to
simple (point) hypothesis testing with a diffuse alternative hypothesis (Sellke et al., 2001),
the plausible set of posterior probabilities of the null hypothesis is P˙0 =
[
P˙ 0, 1
]
with lower
bound
P˙ 0 =
(
1 +
(
1− P˙ prior0
P˙
prior
0 ep
(2) (x) log [1/p(2) (x)]
))−1
∧ P˙ prior0 ,
where ∧ is the minimum operator, and P˙ prior0 is the lowest plausible prior probability that
the null hypothesis is true (Bickel, 2011c). Then the combined p-value P+ ({0}) is P˙ 0 if
p(2) < P˙ 0, p(2) if p(1) < P˙ 0 ≤ p(2), and, according to Corollary 1, the weighted arithmetic
mean w+p(1) + (1− w+) p(2) if p(1) ≥ P˙ 0 with the weights w+ and (1− w+) fixed by eq.
(10). Of the three cases, the third yields a combined p-value that differs from the blended
posterior probability suggested in Bickel (2011a). N
When P¨ consists of a single confidence posterior P¨ , the resulting P+, degenerate as a
“combination” of a single distribution, is better viewed as a solution to the problem of blend-
ing frequentist inference with constraints encoded as the Bayesian posteriors that constitute
P˙ . That solution in general differs from the minimax-type solutions considered (Bickel,
2011a,c). Under P¨ ∈ P˙ and the convexity of P˙ , they lead to the P that minimizes the
information divergence D
(
P ||P¨
)
, which is dual to the Q that minimizes D
(
P¨ ||Q
)
, the
information divergence that is minimized (15) when maximizing eq. (6) according to the
17
game introduced in Sec. 2.2.
3.2.2 Multiple comparison procedures
The distribution-combination theory is now applied to adjustments for multiple comparisons
by formalizing the observation that p-values are often adjusted to the extent of prior belief
in the null hypothesis. That is, multiple comparison procedures (MCPs) designed to control
error rates are “most likely to be used, if at all, when most of the individual null hypotheses
are essentially correct” (Cox, 2006, p.88). A first-order formalization would take the p-value
adjusted according to an MCP as the posterior probability of the null hypothesis. To the
extent that the knowledge or opinion of the agent is such that its decisions would be made to
minimize the expected loss with respect to that posterior distribution, the use of the MCP
is warranted. In this interpretation, combining p-values across different MCPs is equivalent
to combining the posterior distributions that represent the corresponding opinions.
Example 3. The Bonferroni procedure controls the family-wise error rate, the probability
that one or more true null hypotheses will be rejected, at any level α ∈ [0, 1]. That is
accomplished on the basis of p-values p1, . . . , pN by rejecting the ith of N null hypotheses
if the adjusted p-value Npi ∧ 1 is less than α. Thus, the posterior probabilities generated
by the Bonferroni procedure are appropriate only when the prior probability of each null
hypothesis is inversely proportional to the number of tests. As Westfall et al. (1997) pointed
out, the “Bonferroni method is based upon the implicit presumption of a moderate degree of
belief in the event” that all null hypotheses under consideration are true and that the prior
truth values of the hypotheses are approximately independent.
Accordingly, the Bonferroni method is widely used to analyze genome-wide association
data, largely because only an extremely small fraction pi1 of the hundreds of thousands of
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markers tested are thought to be associated with the trait of interest. Wellcome Trust Case
Control Consortium (2007) guessed 10−6 ≤ pi1 ≤ 10−4, interpreting pi1 as the prior probability
of association between a given marker and the trait. The corresponding range of posterior
probabilities and Bayes factors such as those of Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium
(2007) would define P˙ for ruling out MCPs that yield implausible results (Theorem 2). (On
the other hand, some evidence that pi1 ≥ 10−4 is now available in preliminary estimates (Yang
and Bickel, 2010) and in indications that thousands of small-effect SNPs may be associated
with any particular disease (Gibson, 2010; Park et al., 2010).) N
By assuming adjusted p-values are equal to independent posterior probabilities of the
null hypotheses, the methodology of Corollary 2 can combine the results of various MCPs.
4 Large-scale case study
Using microarray technology, Alba et al. (2005) measured the levels of tomato gene expres-
sion for 13,440 genes at three days after the breaker stage of ripening, but one or more
measurements were missing for 7337 genes. The data available across all n = 6 biological
replicates for N = 6103 of the genes illustrate the methodology of Secs. 2 and 3.
For j = 1, . . . , N , the logarithms of the measured ratios of mutant expression to wild-type
expression in the jth gene were modeled as realizations of a normal variate and are denoted
by the n-tuple xj. Because the mean and variance are unknown, the one-sample t-test was
used to test the null hypothesis (ξj = 0) that the population mean is 0 against the two-sided
alternative hypothesis (ξj = 1) that there is differential expression of the jth gene between
mutant and wild type, i.e., that the mutation affects the expression of gene j.
The posterior probability of a null hypothesis conditional on the p-value is called its local
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false discovery rate (LFDR) (Efron et al., 2001). Three very different methods (i = 1, 2, 3) of
estimating the LFDR were considered. The first two methods are based on fitting a histogram
of transformed p-values that is described by Efron (2007). They differ in that whereas one
assumes the p-value has a uniform distribution under the null hypothesis (i = 1), the other
estimates the p-value null distribution by maximizing a truncated likelihood function (i = 2).
Each method has its own advantages (§1). The distributions are called the theoretical null
and the empirical null, respectively. The third method for combination is the q-value (Storey,
2002), here defined according to the algorithm of Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) as the
lowest false discovery rate at which a null hypothesis will be rejected (i = 3). While the
q-value was not originally intended as an estimator of the LFDR, it is included here since
its negative bias as such an estimator (Hong et al., 2009) may have a corrective effect on the
positive bias (conservatism) of the first two LFDR estimators.
For this application, P is the set of all probability distributions on
(
{0, 1}N , 2{0,1}N
)
.
Corresponding to those three methods, let P¨1, P¨2, and P¨3 denote the members of P such that
the ith estimate of the LFDR of the jth gene is P¨i (ξj = 0). To combine the three methods,
P¨ =
{
P¨1, P¨2, P¨3
}
is taken as the set of ν = 3 combining distributions.
For the jth gene, f (t (xj) ; θj) will represent the probability density of the Student t
statistic t (xj), where θj is the reciprocal of the coefficient of variation and, for any θ ∈ R,
f (•; θ) is the probability density function of |T | when T has the noncentral t distribution
of n − 1 degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter √nθ. The set P˙ of plausible
distributions will be determined on the basis of {Lj (•) = f (t (xj) ; •) : j = 1, . . . , N}, the set
of likelihood functions. The plausible distributions are also based on pi0 = 80%, an assumed
lower bound on the proportion of genes that are not differentially expressed. By Bayes’s
theorem, the posterior odds of the jth null hypothesis is the product of the prior odds, which
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is the least pi0/ (1− pi0), and the Bayes factor, which must be at least Lj (0) /maxθ 6=0 Lj (θ).
Thus, for gene j, a lower bound Ωj of the posterior odds is the product of the last two
quantities, and a lower bound of the LFDR is P (ξj = 0) = Ωj/
(
1 + Ωj
)
. In the notation
of Corollary 2, P 0,j = P (ξj = 0) and, trivially, P 0,j = 1 for all j = 1, . . . , N . Thus, the
plausible set specified by eq. (11) consists of the posterior distributions satisfying the lower
bound derived from the likelihood functions and pi0 = 80%.
The horizontal axis and straight line in Fig. 3 represent P , and the intermediate,
highest, and lowest dashed curves represent P¨1, P¨2, and P¨3, respectively. Since some of
the q-values are less than the lower bound
(
∃j : P¨3 (ξj = 0) < P (ξj = 0)
)
but all of the
other LFDR estimates satisfy the bound
(
i = 1, 2;∀j : P¨i (ξj = 0) ≥ P (ξj = 0)
)
, the for-
mer are excluded when computing the combined estimates according to eq. (12), in which
P˙ ∩ P¨ =
{
P¨1, P¨2
}
. Since there are only two distributions, each corresponds to an ex-
treme point, leading to ext
(
P˙ ∩ P¨
)
=
{
P¨1, P¨2
}
in eq. (13). Thereby, the combined
distribution is numerically found to be the linear combination P+ = w1P¨1 + w2P¨2 with
w1 = 0.43 and w2 = 0.57. By implication, the game-optimal LFDR estimate for the jth
gene is P+ (ξj = 0) = w1P¨1 (ξj = 0) + w2P¨2 (ξj = 0). Those combined estimates are plotted
as the solid curve in Fig. 3.
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Appendix A: Remarks
Remark 1. (Sec. 1) Since formulating the distribution combination problem in terms of a
game is unconventional, it is worth noting that game theory laid the foundations of the two
dominant schools of statistical decision theory. The maximum-expected-payoff solution of
a one-player game (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953, Ch. I) led to axiomatic systems
that support Bayesian statistics (e.g., Savage, 1954). Likewise, the worst-case (minimax)
solutions of certain two-player zero-sum games (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953, Ch.
III) led to frequentist decision theory (Wald, 1961).
Remark 2. (Sec. 2.1) The discrete-distribution version of Lemma 1, the main result of the
“redundancy-capacity theorem,” was presented by R. G. Gallager in 1974 (Ryabko, 1981,
Editor’s Note) and published by Ryabko (1979) and Davisson and Leon-Garcia (1980); cf.
Gallager (1979). Cover and Thomas (2006, Theorem 13.1.1), Rissanen (2007, §5.2.1), and
Csiszár and Körner (2011, Problem 8.1) provide useful introductions.
Remark 3. (Sec. 2.2) Previous instances of lexicographically maximizing expected utility
with respect to an optimal probability distribution include the use of the least informative
prior (Seidenfeld, 2004) and the use of the posterior P2 used to maximize D
(
P˙ ||P1  P2
)
28
in a two-player zero-sum game (Bickel, 2011c). On lexicographic decision making in other
contexts, see Levi (1986a, §§5.7, 6.9), Levi (1986b), and Keeney and Raiffa (1993, §3.3.1).
Ciesielski (1997, Ch. 4) and Koshy (2004, Ch. 7) provide more formal set-theoretic exposi-
tions of lexicographic ordering.
Appendix B: Additional proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
For any Q ∈ P , eqs. (2) and (6) yield

sup
〈P ′,P ′′〉∈P˙×P¨
U (P ′, Q, P ′′) =

sup
〈P ′,P ′′〉∈P˙×P¨
〈−D (P ′||P ′′) , D (P ′||Q P ′′)〉
=

sup
P ′∈P˙∩P¨
〈−D (P ′||P ′) , D (P ′||Q P ′)〉
= sup
P ′∈P˙∩P¨
[D (P ′||Q)−D (P ′||P ′)] = sup
P ′∈P˙∩P¨
D (P ′||Q) .
Thus, by eqs. (2), (6), (7), and (8),
P+ = arg

sup
Q∈P
U
(
arg sup
P ′∈P˙∩P¨
D (P ′||Q) , arg sup
P ′∈P˙∩P¨
D (P ′||Q) , Q
)
= arg sup
Q∈P
(
−D
(
arg sup
P ′∈P˙∩P¨
D (P ′||Q) ||Q
))
= arg inf
Q∈P
sup
P ′∈P˙∩P¨
D (P ′||Q) . (15)
Hence, according to eq. (3), P+ is ˜˙P ∩ P¨ , the centroid of P˙ ∩ P¨ . Since P˙ ∩ P¨ 6= ∅ by
assumption, the conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied.
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Proof of Lemma 2
As an immediate consequence of what Nakagawa and Kanaya (1988) label “Theorem (Csiszár)”
and “Theorem 1,”
min
P ′′∈P
max
P ′∈P?
D (P ′||P ′′) = C.
By definition, the centroid is the solution of that minimax problem (3).
Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 1 implies that
˜
ext
(
P˙ ∩ P¨
)
, the centroid of ext
(
P˙ ∩ P¨
)
, is PWext(P˙∩P¨) . Since, ac-
cording to the definition of an extreme point and the definition of a centroid (3), it is
not possible that there exist a P ′ ∈ ext
(
P˙ ∩ P¨
)
and a P ′′ ∈ ext
(
P˙ ∩ P¨
)
such that
D
(
P ′|| ˜ext
(
P˙ ∩ P¨
))
< D
(
P ′′|| ˜ext
(
P˙ ∩ P¨
))
, it follows that
D
(
P ?||PWext(P˙∩P¨)
)
= max
P ′∈ext(P˙∩P¨)
D
(
P ′||PWext(P˙∩P¨)
)
for all P ? ∈ ext
(
P˙ ∩ P¨
)
. According to Lemma 2, PWext(P˙∩P¨) is ˜˙P ∩ P¨ , the centroid of P˙ ∩P¨ .
That centroid is P+ by Theorem 1.
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Figure 1: Optimal weight w+ versus P¨ ({0}) and P¨ ({0}), the lowest and highest of the
plausible probabilities to be combined (10), labeled here as “min. probability” and “max.
probability,” respectively. The combination probability is P+ (0) = w+P¨ (0)+(1− w+) P¨ (0)
according to Corollary 1.
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Figure 2: Three equal-weight averages of probabilities and the game-theoretic combination
of two probabilities based on Corollary 1. The two probabilities that are combined are drawn
in solid gray.
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Figure 3: Combination of estimates of local false discovery rates, which are empirical Bayes
posterior probabilities that the null hypotheses of equivalent gene expression are true.
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